from the perspective of state and local enforcement agencies eager for federal dollars without federal mandates, the LEAA was surely a success that only improved with time. Its budget kept increasing, at least until 1977. 12 And the bureaucratic steps that stood between agencies, particularly large police forces, and their money were only reduced. 13 But the LEAA soon fell out of favor in Washington, attacked by Jimmy Carter for wasting money, and finally phased out by Ronald Reagan in 1982. As Philip Heymann and Mark Moore put it: "[S]tarting in the 1980s, the federal role in financing state and local efforts was de-emphasized in favor of reasserting a direct federal operational role in dealing with crime. LEAA was declared a failure, its name changed, its authorization narrowed, its appropriations slashed, and its bureaucratic status reduced -the public equivalent of a corporate bankruptcy." 14 Many of the criminal statutes needed to support this "direct federal operational role" were already on the books by 1980: drug trafficking offenses, gun offenses, and racketeering laws. And, in any event, more were soon passed by legislators eager to show their commitment to the Wars on Crime and Drugs. 15 What really changed in the 1980s, however, was the readiness of the federal government to commit investigative and adjudication resources to street crime, and to pay for the incarceration of convicted offenders.
It is hard fully to quantify the degree to which federal enforcers in the 1980s moved into what hitherto had been local cases. The number of drug cases certainly climbed. 16 But that number includes both higher and lower level trafficking offenses. And while, as we increasingly see, 17 federal weapons charges can be used against street criminals, the large number of federal weapons prosecutions brought during this period 18 could have had other targets as well. By the 1990s, however, efforts by both the Bush(I) and Clinton administrations to raise the visibility of federal enforcement operations against street criminals made the extent of federal activity quite clear.
The nouns fly fast and furious here. "Project Triggerlock," announced in 1991 by Attorney General Thornburgh, asked U.S. Attorneys to work with local police forces to identify repeat and violent offenders who used guns and to prosecute them in federal court. 19 In January 1992, the FBI announced its "Safe Street Violent Crimes Initiative," focusing on "violent gangs, crimes of violence, and the apprehension of violent fugitives." 20 In August 1992, ATF announced "Operation Achilles Heel," and pledged to work with state and local authorities to round up 600 "of this nation's most violent criminals." 21 During the summer of 1992, the chief of the Criminal Division in the FBI's New York office told some agents that "terrorism was dead," and tried to move them away from investigating the group later responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and into urban gang investigations. 22 The change in presidential administrations did not significantly alter the trajectory of federal enforcement policy in this area, or the desire to highlight it. In 1994, Vice President Gore and Attorney General Reno announced the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative. And while there was sustained debate on Capitol Hill about the Clinton Administration's approach to gun crimes, the only real issue was whether the federal interest in pursuing these offenses could be served by federally sponsored state prosecutions as well as federal prosecutions (as the Clinton Administration wanted) or whether only federal prosecutions would do (as Republican opponents suggested). 23 Between 1989 and 1998, the number of federal firearms prosecutions went up 61%. 24 And by 2000, the FBI could boast of having deployed Safe Streets Task Forces that included 805 FBI special agents, 251 other federal agents, and 1,096 state and local law enforcement participants (whose overtime the Bureau paid for). 25 The efforts by the Bush(I) and Clinton administrations to deploy federal agents and prosecutors against violent crime -either on their own or in various joint task forces -did not come at the expense of federal grants to state and local governments in this area. Indeed, both in their dollar amounts and in the discretion they gave to state and local enforcers, federal grant programs took off during the 1990s. The Crime Control Act of 1990 26 authorized $900 million for the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance programs -which funded narcotics enforcement and were administered by the states. 27 With the election of Bill Clinton, and in the wake of his campaign promise to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets came the Violent 19 Project Exile, supra note __, at 374. 20 FBI, Safe Street Violent Crime Initiative Report, FY 2000, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/safestreets/ssgu00.pdf 21 Project Exile, supra note __,at 375. 22 John Miller, et al, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It 84 (2003) . 23 Project Exile, supra note __. 24 Patrick Walker and Pragati Patrick, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Trends in Firearms Cases from Fiscal Year 1989 through 1998, and the Workload Implications for the U.S. District Courts (Apr. 4, 2000) , available at http://www.uscourts.gov/firearms/firearms00.html. 25 See FBI, Street Violent Crime Initiative Report, FY 2000, supra note __, at 2-3. 26 Pub. L. 101-647. 27 See Garrine P. Laney, Crime Control Assistance through the Byrne Programs, CRS Report, 97-265 GOV (updated May 20, 1998).
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 28 which "authorized the spending of a staggering $30 billion to help State and local enforcement agencies fight crime over the 6-year life of the bill's coverage." 29 The big development here was a readiness -in the form of the COPS ("Community Oriented Police Services") programs to put money directly into the hand of local police departments, and in particular big city police departments.
30 By 1997, local crime prevention took a bigger slice of the Justice Department's budget than the FBI, DEA, or INS. In fact, among all Justice components, only the Bureau of Prisons got more than the units that funneled money to state and local enforcers.
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How dependent did state and local governments become on this federal assistance? The answer eludes easy quantification. 32 Yet in California, where the annual expenditures on law enforcement agencies ranged between $7 and 8.7 billion in 1995-98, 33 the Legislative Analysis Office could report that the agencies had received "almost $343 million through the COPS program" between 1995 and 1997, "almost $72 million in block grants" in 1997 alone, and could expect "almost $50 million" in Byrne grants for 1998. 34 And it advised that, given this influx of federal funds to state police agencies, the Legislature need to determine "whether state funds for law enforcement [could] be reduced or redirected to other parts of the criminal justice system that have not received new federal monies." 35 This is not the place to debate whether these federal grant programs achieved or even furthered their stated goal of crime reduction. I don't even want to venture into the controversy of how many more cops ended up patrolling the streets. 36 readily appropriated large sums of money for these endeavors, could tout their commitment as well, but there was more to it than that. For the essence of the violent crime targeted by the enforcement and funding programs discussed here was local.
While there was much talk, and perhaps some reality, of coordination, innovation, and "best practices," the thrust of these programs was to deploy federal dollars and manpower against local problems. And with each conspicuous deployment, be it funding grant or enforcement program, a legislator's press release could take some credit. Congressional representatives could also take credit for relieving local enforcers of burdensome grant compliance. 37 The interests of Federal enforcement agencies were also well served by the new violent crime priorities. The general public was happy to see the "feds" deployed against local bad guys -street gangs, armed robbers, and murderers. And the championship of these cases by local legislative delegations could only redound to the benefit of agencies at funding time, and to field offices in their relations with headquarters. The timing for the FBI was particularly propitious, as the end of the Cold War allowed the redeployment of agents from counterintelligence to anti-violence assignments. 38 Even better, was the extent of federal enforcement discretion in this area. There may have been political pressure to do violent crime cases. But there was little pressure to any particular case. Violent crime was still, after all, primarily a local responsibility. Federal agencies thus could be quite strategic in their case selection decisions.
Local enforcers welcomed the federal enforcement and funding assistance. The Supreme Court might bemoan federal intrusion into a traditionally local domain. 39 But local enforcers had less interest in airy notions of dignity and accountability, and more in direct grants, overtime pay, and the aid-in-kind that federal enforcement activity -and the significant procedural and sentencing advantages flowing therefrom --really amounted to. 40 After all, despite the occasional turf-battle, the fact is that federal agencies can rarely do violent crime cases without the help of the local police, who alone control "the informational networks on which federal law enforcement agencies must rely when pursuing episodic criminal activity." 41 So although judges decried the flood of "state" cases into federal court, 42 and defendants who expected to be prosecuted in state court, complained when they were somewhat arbitrarily selected out for harsher federal sentences, 43 state and law enforcers could and did look on this federal "intrusion" with equanimity, and sometimes even glee.
This decade of direct grants, block grants, and enforcement assistance from the federal government to state and local authorities did not come to an end with the election of George W. Bush. With great fanfare, the new President announced an "Initiative to Reduce Gun Violence," and, as he had in his campaign, embraced a program of maximal federal involvement in gun violence prosecutions. 44 And in a May 2001 memo to department heads, Attorney General Ashcroft included, as two of his seven goals, "reducing drug violence and drug trafficking," and "helping states with anti-crime programs." He did not even mention terrorism. 45 To be sure, the new Administration announced plans to phase out the COPS program 46 -not that surprising, given that Republicans had long questioned of the efficacy of this Clinton program that tended to funnel most of its money to big city Democratic strongholds. 47 But the plan envisioned a reconfiguring of federal aid in the violent crime area, not a transfer away from it. Then came the attacks on September 11, 2001.
The Post-9/11 Dynamic We are often told that September 11 "changed everything." Perhaps this is an overstatement in some contexts. But I believe the assessment dead on when applied to the federal, state and local law enforcement dynamic.
The shock to the federal enforcement bureaucracy was extraordinary. Before this, there were a few specialized "beats" that the feds had to patrol. 49 But the system's defining luxury was the absence of any responsibility to pursue any particular case in most of the areas in which it had jurisdiction. Now, all of a sudden, it was saddled with a politically unavoidable, 50 and all-but-impossible responsibility: preventing another such attack.
To their credit, federal enforcement officials made a concerted effort to reach out to state and local agencies for intelligence-gathering assistance, and diplomatically sought to address long-standing local complaints about the feds' reluctance to share information. FBI Director Mueller made conciliatory speeches, 51 and created a new Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, headed by a former police chief, within the FBI. 52 Attorney General Ashcroft announced the creation of Anti-Terrorism Task Forces within each district, and set up mechanisms for these units to coordinate with state and local authorities. 53 (These "task forces," with their outreach function, are not to be 49 54 The Office of Homeland Security and, after the up-grade, the Department of Homeland Security also sought to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. 55 These moves all testified to the new intergovernment intelligence dynamic. Given the nature of the perceived terrorist threat -the sleeper cells waiting to strike again 56 ----federal agencies now relied on the intelligence capabilities of local police forces in a way they never did when the primary area of interaction was violent crime. Back then, the feds needed help from the locals, but since they could walk away from any case and had could offer many benefits, they had considerable leverage. Now, the rush was on to create the semblance of a national intelligence network providing what Philip Heymann has called "untargeted prevention." 57 And, in this, the participation of local cops was absolutely essential.
What state and local enforcers bring to the counterterrorism intelligence-gathering process is not simply a function of their numbers -638,066 state and local police officers compared to 88,496 federal law enforcement officers (more than a quarter of whom were in the Federal Bureau of Prisons) in 1999-2000 58 -nor even of the many things they learn
Govts at 24 (2003) (purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force "is to centralize the process by which information relevant to the investigation and prosecution of terrorists can be shared with state and local officials."). 80-82 (MIT Press 1998) (comparing "targeted prevention" -where subjects & plans are known --with "untargeted prevention" -whose "purpose is to make it more risky and difficult to carry out a bombing or other terrorist act and thereby to reduce that level of terrorist events by, at a minimum, increasing the time, expense, and effort for each, and perhaps also reducing what may be a very limited total pool of participants by discouraging beginner, increasing defections, and incapacitating the firmly committed."); see also National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002) (stating goal of "build[ing] a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information horizontally across each agency of the federal government and vertically among federal, state, and local governments, private industry, and citizens").
while on street patrol. It also stems from their involvement in bringing the bulk of serious criminal charges in the United States, 59 because the threat of prosecution (even prosecutions having nothing to do with terrorism) is one of best tools around for prying loose closely held information. Their order maintenance and public safety duties also give local police a more balanced "portfolio" in dealing with community leaders. The police officer who seeks information from a local Arab-American community leader has probably met, and assisted that leader before. 60 The Justice Department quickly went beyond vague talk of "information sharing" and asked for local assistance in a large-scale program to interview thousands of people (mostly young Middle Eastern males) in the country on non-immigrant visas. 61 In the Spring of 2002, the Department went further and announced its plan to place of names of certain aliens who had violated their visa requirements into the national database of wanted suspects. It asked state and local police to arrest these "absconders," and noted that, as a legal matter, such assistance was "within the inherent authority of the states." , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/terrorism2.htm. 62 As Attorney General Ashcroft explained when announcing the "National Security Entry-Exit Registration System," June 6, 2002, http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/preparedremarks.htm: "When federal, state and local law enforcement officers encounter an alien of national security concern who has been listed on the NCIC for violating immigration law, federal law permits them to arrest that individual and transfer him to the custody of the INS. "The Justice Department''s Office of Legal Counsel has concluded that this narrow, limited mission that we are asking state and local police to undertake voluntarily --arresting aliens who have violated criminal provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act or civil provisions that render an alien deportable, and who are listed on the NCIC --is within the inherent authority of the states. The Department of Justice has no plans to seek additional support from state and Before focusing on the local response to these particular federal initiatives, one should note that the predominant response of local police forces to the federal calls for assistance in the War on Terror was to line up at the recruiting station and complain about delays. Big city police forces moved to relax the intelligence gathering restrictions that had been imposed in the wake of abuses in the 1960s and 1970s. 63 And the constant drumbeat from police departments during 2002 and into 2003 was that the feds weren't sharing information with the locals, weren't putting them "'in the game.'" took stands (pretty symbolic, to be sure 66 ) against the Administration's counter-terrorism efforts. The town of Arcata (population 16,000) barred its officials from assisting in investigations carried out under the USA Patriot Act; officials who don't tell the city manager when contacted by federal authorities pursuing investigations under the Act are to be fined $57. 67 The Seattle city council reaffirmed its support for an ordinance limiting the ability of local police to gather or share information on religious or political groups."
68 Some stands were more than symbolic. In December 2001, notwithstanding opinions to contrary by the Oregon attorney general and local district attorney, the Portland City Attorney announced that state law -barring police police from "detecting or apprehending" people who have violated only fed immigration law, and from collecting info on political, social or religious beliefs unless it pertains to a criminal investigation -prohibited Portland police from asking some of the 33 questions that the Justice Department wanted posed to 23 foreigners in area.
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Some of this scattered resistance may have arisen from partisan politics or liberal reflexes. But there was a historical basis as well, for the federal efforts to recruit local police into a national intelligence network brought back memories of 1968, when the feds had urged the locals to create "'intelligence units" to gather and disseminate information on "potential" civil disorders.'" 70 The Church Committee later recounted the result of these efforts: "Local police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to acquire information it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such as developing campus informants. For example, in 1969, Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot be developed" by the Bureau. Field offices were instructed, however, that one way to continue obtaining intelligence on "situations having a potential for violence" was to develop "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement agencies. " Instead of recruiting student informants itself, the FBI would rely on local police to do so." "These Federal policies contributed to the proliferation of local police 66 See Michael Riley, Denver Post, Limits on Terror Fight Eyed, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1 (reporting police as saying that "most rank and file police work is unlikely to be affected by the resolution." "'The FBI rarely asks us for help. They don't need to,' said David Nell, president of the Denver police union. 'This is about as relevant as the nuclear-free zone in Boulder.'"). 67 intelligence activities, often without adequate controls. One result was that still more persons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity, nor belonged to groups which might be violent." 71 All this was not ancient history to local authorities in places like Denver, which in 2002 was still negotiating a settlement with the ACLU relating to abuses by the police intelligence bureau, and New York City, where a consent degree arising out of similar abuses is still in place. 72 Local concerns were not merely partisan, philosophical or historical. They also grew out of local politics. When the federal-local interaction was centered on violent crime, federal initiatives brought significant positive externalities -credit for local leaders and maybe even improved local safety. The counterterrorism dynamic has been precisely the reverse (with some important exceptions, e.g. NYC). There is no reason to expect that terrorists pose a particular threat to the many of the places where they or information about them will be found. (Detroit is a great example.) In those areas, the gains from domestic intelligence gathering thus are felt primarily, even exclusively at the national level. But the costs of gathering fall on the localities. And I am not even talking about the fiscal cost right now, but rather to the significant negative externalities that attend any large-scale investigations of immigrant activities in communities that have large numbers of immigrants.
Police department, of course, don't always share the concerns of their political masters. But police officials have had their own pragmatic concerns about federal counterterrorism initiatives, particularly those involving the use of federal immigration statutes. As the "chief counsel's column" on the website of the International Association of Chiefs of Police explained in the Fall of 2002:
[E]nforcement of civil immigration laws by local law enforcement would have a chilling effect on both legal and illegal aliens reporting criminal activity or assisting police in criminal investigations. Local police want illegal aliens to come forward when they have been the victims of, or witnesses to, crimes. Police depend on the cooperation of immigrant communities to help them solve all sorts of crimes and to maintain public order. Without the assurances that they will not be deported, many illegal immigrants with critical information would not come forward."
A Georgia police chief recalled that, after police had taken part in several INS raids to round up illegal immigrants in the early 1990s, "[v]ery quickly, people in the community associated us with the INS. That's exactly what you don't want." He called the Justice Department's proposal "a horrible idea." 74 Other police chiefs expressed similar sentiments. 75 One congressional representative recently reported on her conversations with police officials in California "that most police chiefs and most local law enforcement agencies oppose the idea of having to enforce immigration laws. Some of them oppose it because it adds an additional burden on them in trying to carry out their local law enforcement duties. And others oppose it because they fear that that would create a risk with the very immigrant communities that they seek assistance from or information from in helping enforce local laws …." 76 Few non-federal enforcement officials seemed disposed to assist the feds in using the immigration laws as a law enforcement tool, even though, as one federal official noted, "the only barriers to executing such arrests are statutes or policies that states or municipalities have imposed upon themselves."
77 Indeed, it's interesting to note that perhaps the biggest local initiative in the immigration area during this period was the readiness to allow illegal Mexican immigrants to use identification cards issued by the Mexican government, 78 a practice that an FBI official says "poses a criminal and terrorist threat." 79 The non-federal officials most disposed to assist in enforcing the immigration laws seem to come from the state level, not the local. The New York story is revealing. In early 2002 (if not before), James Kallstrom, the State's "counterterrorism czar," was said by State Police Superintendent James McMahon, to have asked DOJ to "crosslicense local police," to allow them to arrest undocumented immigrants. "'Everything we're trying to do here in this effort to prevent (terrorism) is to utilize the full resources of 70,000 state and local cops in New York state ….'" 80 Thereafter, Governor Pataki put the plan on hold, reportedly "because of mounting opposition from civil libertarians and immigrant groups who fear police would engage in racial profiling and harass otherwise law-abiding people who are in the country illegally." 81 Perhaps even more revealing is the dynamic in Maryland. There, "[m]any local police departments [], including those in Baltimore and in Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties, generally will not report illegal immigrants unless they have committed crimes." 82 However, "state police policy is to information federal authorities about any suspected of being in the country illegally." 83 As of the summer of 2003, only Florida and Alabama had formally signed on to the federal initiative, and in Alabama it appears that only state troopers are involved. 84 Why the difference between the attitudes of local police departments and their statewide counterparts? Straightforward political differences may play a part hereRepublican governors versus more liberal urban local officials. But institutional obligations (or the lack thereof) likely play a role as well. For it is at the local level and particularly in big cities, that the costs imposed by the federal enforcement initiative on relationships with immigrant communities would hit hardest.
Even had nothing else changed in the relationship between federal and local enforcers, the new federal counterterrorism initiatives would have imposed new intelligence gathering responsibilities on the police and arguably have made it harder to maintain order in areas with significant immigrant populations, including most big cities. But the costs effectively imposed on the police by the federal counterterrorism focus have gone far beyond that because with that focus has come at the expense of federal activity in the violent crime area. Some federal enforcement activity has continued, particularly when it comes to bringing gun cases. For these, ATF's involvement in the President's Project Safe Neighborhood will doubtless continue at a high level, now that the agency has been transferred to the Justice Department, whose leader has long championed maximal federal effort on this front. 87 But elsewhere, there has been a clear drop-off in federal deployment. As a Wall Street Journal report put it: "Already hard pressed by a shaky economy and budget cuts, police departments across the country must fill the void left by the reassigned FBI agents, investigating more bank robberies, violent crimes, and other big cases."
88 Perhaps some FBI field offices have been "reluctant to pull out of drug and gang investigations because they fear losing contacts with local agencies." . 90 The number of FBI agents assigned to drug cases had also gone way done, and it was not clear whether the Drug Enforcement Administration would be filling the gap. The report noted: "The overall reduction in combined FBI and DEA staffing of drug enforcement positions and the change in strategy removes some drug enforcement assistance from local jurisdictions at a time when many, if not most, state and local budgets are under intense pressure." 91 Note that the point here is not that the shift in federal resources was a mistake. Indeed, as I've said elsewhere, I believe that one of the greatest benefits flowing from the federal enforcement bureaucracy's relative lack of political accountability is its flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. 92 And, although the system may be overreacting to September 11, it may also be underreacting. I have no idea. What I am suggesting, though, is that the duration and apparent stability of federal agencies' commitment to street crime enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s set a new baseline for local expectations of federal enforcement assistance. And these expectations now are not being met.
A similar desire to refrain from sweeping normative judgments must also accompany my assessment of intergovernmental relations on the fiscal front. The economic downturn and the political popularity of tax cuts have obviously placed new budget pressure on state and local governments in 2002-03. That pressure surely plays critical background role in intergovernmental relations across every policy area. But the appropriate level of government at which taxes should be raised and spent --and how high those taxes should be --are not matters to which I bring any particular expertise.
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In the fiscal area, too, my focus is not on what is the right policy but on policy expectations, and specifically on how the creation of local grievances is likely to affect the law enforcement dynamic. The new sensitivity to the terrorist threat has required massive expenditures at the state and local levels. 94 How much of these expenses should be borne by the federal government has been very much a subject of political debate in 2003, with even Homeland Security Secretary Ridge conceding that initial plans to elevate interstateequity above more fine-grained assessments of need ought to be revisited. 95 In the meantime, though, state and local governments have been forced to choose between spending more when the federal Homeland Security color code moves up or holding steady, relying on their own risk assessment, and assuming the risk of being wrong. To the extent that officials have responded to federal signals, the color codes have thus become a species of unfunded mandate. 96 There may be an emerging trend of officials who follow independent courses, but that will have its own cost to the federal government when it comes to security coordination. 97 If one source of intergovernmental tension is the overall level of federal homeland security funding, another (perhaps even more disruptive) source of tension is the way federal funds will be distributed. One police chief complained in a Spring 2003 congressional hearing that homeland security 94 (29% say "more guidance from the federal government is needed.)"available at www.nlc.org/nlc/_org/site/newsroom/nations_cities_weekly/ resources do not go directly to local police departments. They cannot be used to hire new police. They cannot be used to pay overtime expenses that we incur each and every time Secretary Ridge changes the alert level. They can be used to purchase equipment, but not by me. I have to wait for a statewide plan to be developed and then I have to hope that a fair share of those funds will filter to my department. 98 As a mayor put it in another hearing at around the same time: "After all, a 9-1-1 call does not get a state trooper." 99 The U.S. Conference of Mayors has (unsurprisingly) expressed similar sentiments: "[W]e strongly believe that a majority of the [first responders] funding must be provided directly to cities and counties to avoid delays and ensure that our nation's front-line troops -which are predominately at the local levelhave immediate access to flexible resources." 100 And members have suggested that partisan politics help explain the Republican administration's reluctance to give money directly to urban areas. 101 Given that local governments will eventually get much of the homeland security funding, there are arguments for funneling the money through the states, and thus encouraging statewide coordination. 102 104 And, indeed, recent years have seen some states endeavoring to be not just funding brokers but informational intermediaries -doing more in the way of intelligence collection and dissemination and counterterrorism training. 105 Because they see cities as bearing the brunt (in both fiscal and political costs) of any nationwide intelligence gathering and security patrolling effort, local officials, particularly from bigger cities, would likely have complained about the very nature of Bush Administration's substantial embrace 106 of the statewide funding model for homeland security. Their sense of grievance has been intensified, however, by their perception that it is "their" violent crime money that is now going to the states.
The fungibility of money makes the link impossible to prove. And, in the Bush Administration's defense, it should be noted that the COPS program has always been a Republican target. Yet urban officials have made much of the coincidence that the COPS program is being phased out, and other crime control grants reduced, 107 just as homeland security funding plans are being made. As one police chief recently testified: " [T] here is a concern in the law enforcement community, that new assistance programs are being funded at the expense of traditional law enforcement assistance programs such as the COPS program, the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program and the Byrne Grant program." 108 And as a mayor testifying last year on behalf of the Conference of Mayors put it, when complaining of plans to cut COPS by 80% and transfer other monies into the state-controlled Byrne grant program: "We must ensure that cities have the resources needed to fight both the domestic war on terrorism and the continuing war against crime. We cannot simply 'Rob Peter to Pay Paul.'" 109 As I write this (October 2003), the fiscal picture is still in flux (as it probably will be for some time), with the budget wars (shocking to say) a perfect vehicle for partisan agendas. 110 Congressional Democrats have been championing the cause of urban police departments for more COPS money, and the cause of "first responders" more generally suggests that these efforts have been well coordinated with federal agencies and have enhanced federal capabilities.
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What about other cities -particularly a city like Detroit, which will be losing its COPS money and federal enforcement assistance against violent crime, does not rank at the top of the list of potential terrorist targets, and has a large Middle East immigrant population that is both a potential source of intelligence information and of political backlash to aggressive federal counterterrorist tactics?
There are many possible endings to this story. But I focus on two stylized endings, one pessimistic; the other optimistic. The first presages an increasing rift between local and federal enforcers, as the inherent collective action problem posed by any nationwide counterterrorism effort is compounded by the use of tactics perceived as over-aggressive in many communities and by local grievances arising out of dashed hopes for continuing federal support against violent crime. It is of course possible that federal enforcers will, over time, do a better job of reaching out to communities on their own. Such efforts are indeed in progress. 116 Nonetheless, the relative narrowness of federal enforcement concerns and the (related) comparative distance of federal agencies from the lives of people in densely populated urban communities would likely make a federally centered intelligence gathering effort a poor substitute for a more integrated national network. 115 See Remarks prepared for delivery by FBI Dir. Robert S. Mueller, III, at Citizen's Crime Comm'n of New York, Dec. 19, 2002 (calling NYPD's Counterterrorism Division and the its "newly revamped Intelligence Division" "models for the nation"), available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/milsteinlecture.htm. But see GAO Report, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened, supra note __, at 14 ("Officials from the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledge that states' and cities' efforts to create their own [intelligence] centers are resulting in duplication and that some cities may be reaching out to foreign intelligence sources independently from the federal government. These officials emphasized that state and local authorities should work through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces to receive the information they require.").
Note that under draft Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003: DOJ would support communities in terminating state law enforcement consent decrees from before 9/11 (except where related to racial profiling). Cites Those looking for more evidence of the fraught nature of federal information gathering initiatives need only to follow the TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention System) debacle. First mentioned by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Speech, the program was pitched by the Justice Department as a way to enlist the observatory powers of service providers around the nation in the War on Terror. Before long, under pressure by many in Congress and elsewhere, the program was reconfigured to "involve only truckers, dock workers, bus drivers and others who are in positions to monitor places and events that are obviously public." 117 Even that was not enough, and the initiative was soon legislated out of existence. 118 There is a far more optimistic ending, though. The fiscal and operational pressures on federal resources may preclude either the resuscitation of the violent-crime model of intergovernmental interaction or the outright enlistment 119 of state and local governments in a federally directed counterterrorism campaign. But in place of the violent-crime model will emerge a counterterrorism-based model that courts state and local assistance by giving them a greater voice in how the federal government interacts with citizens, and particularly with immigrant communities.
Secrecy obviously has its place in any counterterrorist program. And if every tip and the planning of how it is to be followed up have to be shared with enforcers and agencies across the nation and at every level of government, operational effectiveness will surely be reduced (if not completely precluded). Institutional considerations reinforce operational considerations on this point. If we want to tear down the "wall" that has hampered cooperation between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community (especially the CIA) in the past, we will have to create a federal domain of very closely held information to ensure that actual or alleged security considerations don't become excuses for information hoarding.
However important it is for the Federal Government to move into the terrorism prevention business, that line of work has historically posed peculiar risks to democratic society. Domestic intelligence operations lack the outcome measures of regular law enforcement, have extremely low visibility because of security sensitivities, and often involve political or potentially political judgments. The more committed an agency is to these operations, the greater its need for political cover from the White House, which has often been tempted to extract intelligence targeting power in return, and to use that power for inappropriate political ends. This dynamic helps explain why the FBI -though traditionally ready to provide political intelligence to Presidents 120 ----was able to resist the pressure from Lyndon Johnson to connect antiwar protests to foreign subversion, and the CIA was not. 121 In the community policing literature, those who argue for greater sensitivity to community preferences have to confront questions of who represents the community, and whether the community has been adequately organized to convey its preferences. 122 When one scales up the model to the national level, however, this may be less of an issue, as there already are institutional structures --cities, towns, countiesthat can legitimately speak to local concerns and, while doing so, promote the gathering of local information. Precisely how the federal interest in a national intelligence network can be squared with demands for accountability (and consequent sensitivity) at the local level is something that government officials in cities like Portland, Oregon, and Boise, Idaho, have struggled to work out. In both cities, federal regulations restricting access to intelligence information clashed with civilian oversight mechanisms. 123 The contours of 120 CHECK: See Church Comm Report: "The FBI practice of supplying political information to the White such local struggles will vary from place to place. But their effect on the sensitivity of federal officials to local politics -heightened when congressional representatives take up the causes of local officials 124 ----will be salutary.
Had the new demands on local enforcers not been accompanied by a broad shift away from the violent crime model of intergovernment relationships, would local officials have been similarly prone to push back against federal demands? As with all such counterfactuals, this one is hard to answer. Everyone, we are told, has his price, and presumably this applies to local officials being asked by federal authorities to assist in times of national need. We need not answer this question, however, to say that the shift away from the violent crime model has significantly affected these officials' readiness to question the fiscal and political costs that federal counterterrorism policies threaten to impose on them. Perhaps they will be bought off in the future with a new influx of federal money. But more likely, in this Panglossian tale, the shift in federal prioritiesand the effect of that shift on state and local officials --will play a critical role in ensuring that, in their new focus on counterterrorism, federal authorities do not lose sight of the values of those they protect. Indeed, in an area where constitutional and statutory guarantees are ill-defined and where they may not cover what many would consider to be troubling government action, 125 this developing dynamic may offer the best promise of appropriately tempered zeal as we move into the post-9/11 era.
